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ABSTRACTThe Financial Crisis of 2008 has been especially hard on European Southern countries which,although some cautious signs of recovery, are still struggling to find their way out of it and returnto previous levels of occupation and growth. During the last decade, many prominent scholarsand politicians have blamed the Euro for such difficulties and paved the way for debate about itsbreak-up as a possible solution. Unsurprisingly, such debate has been particularly lively in Italy.The paper deals with the possibility of Italy leaving the Euro and seeks to address the question ofits feasibility, not only from an economic perspective of cost-benefit analysis but also by examin-ing legal issues and possible political repercussions and technical difficulties. It does so by re-viewing the main arguments from pro-exit literature and by assessing them according to the Eu-ropean Treaties and to official stances of EU officials and other important politicians.Keywords: Euro; Italy; Europe.
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I. INTRODUCTIONIn recent years, the debate about the possibility of leaving the common cur-rency has grown exponentially, especially since the financial crisis outbreak in2008. It is no surprise that such debate has been particularly lively in Italy, aperipheral country marked by low growth and high levels of unemploymentand public debt. Many political forces are, in fact, calling for the country to ditchthe common currency. But should Italy do so? And, more importantly, is therea way to legally exit the common currency? In this essay, I try to address thelegal and political issues that Italy would have to overcome if decides to leavethe EMU. As a result of such analysis, I seek to demonstrate that, especially be-cause of the enormous political costs Italy would suffer, leaving the Euro is nota feasible option.In the first section, I will analyze the main characteristics of the Euro-exitdebate, focusing especially on the Italian situation. Later on, in the two mainsections, I will try to address all the major legal issues and political repercus-sions Italy would face when exiting the currency union and briefly deal withthe main economic and procedural difficulties the country would undergo. Indoing this, I will also try to show some of the biggest flaws pro-exit literaturepresents and ultimately display why Italy should not leave the common cur-rency. Finally, in the conclusions, I will sum up the main reasons which makeditching the Euro not a feasible option for Italy.
II. THE DEBATE ON THE BREAK-UP OF THE EUROZONEThe current Europe-wide debate on the possibility of the break-up of the Euroshould not surprise anyone. This scenario was already discussed even beforethe single currency existed (cfr. Scott, 1998). Even in the first years of the Euro,its appreciation against the dollar and problems of slow growth led some poli-ticians to blame the ECB for disappointing economic performance and to arguefor the dismantling of the Euro.1 Though, the turning point has been the finan-cial crisis of 2008, which has surfaced and exacerbated many of the pre-exist-ing problems, especially divergence in productivity performances, current ac-count deficits and excessive amounts of external debt. This has obviously ledEuro break-up debate to gain momentum.
1 In June 2005, Italian Welfare Minister Roberto Maroni declared that “the Euro has to go”and called for the reintroduction of the lira. The then prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi followedby calling the Euro “a disaster”.
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The southern countries2 are trapped in recession and since they are in aMonetary Union (MU) they cannot restore competitiveness through the typicalmean of devaluating their currencies. At the same time, the northern countriesare being asked to compromise their prudential fiscal policy and accept expan-sive monetary policies by the ECB to help the South get out of the recession.This has brought us to a situation where southern countries are risking out-breaks and social unrests and public supports for European integration is fall-ing behind everywhere in Europe.Across the continent many prominent scholars and politicians have startedto believe that the Euro is at the base of such crisis and have raised their voices.To them, the Common Currency is producing “divisions and tensions that un-dermine the very foundations of the European Union and the Common Market”and has turned into a “serious threat to the project of European Integration”(Amaral Do et al., 2013, 1). According to Tepper (2012), for instance, the Euro“is like a modern-day gold standard where the burden of adjustment falls onweaker countries. Like the gold standard, the Euro forces adjustment in realprices and wages instead of exchange rates” and “So long as the peripheralcountries stay in the Euro, they will bear the burdens of adjustment and becondemned to contraction or low growth” (Tepper, 2012, 2). Eichengreen(2010) carries this point even further. It is his opinion, in fact, that sticking tothe gold standard was the major factor preventing governments from fightingthe Great Depression and the same argument could now apply to the Eurozonecrisis. Basically, the common currency is what is keeping Europe away fromsolving the crisis. A strong j’accuse has even come from the Nobel prize winnerJoseph Stiglitz, who has blamed the Euro for poorer growth and more divisive-ness in his latest book (Stiglitz, 2016b).These people think that leaving the Euro would be the optimal solution, es-pecially for the peripheral countries who have suffered the most from the crisisand have the most to gain from the wide devaluation their new currencieswould suffer (or enjoy?) after ditching the monetary union. Most pro-exitersadmit that leaving the Euro would come at high costs. Yet, such costs are neg-ligible compared to the situation of perpetual below-potential growth and highunemployment these countries would suffer if they remain in the Eurozone.They are a necessary evil that southern countries must bear if they want tobenefit from having their own currency and eventually start growing again.
2 Southern countries/peripheral countries and Northern countries/core countries are in-terchangeable labels for two groups of countries. The former includes Greece, Italy, Portugal,Spain and Ireland. The latter includes Germany, the Be-Ne-Lux and the Scandinavian countries.France is a particular case which probably stands in the middle of these two groups. I will useboth definitions of both groups in this paper without any distinction.
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Not surprisingly, the debate about the exit from the Euro (and even fromthe European Union) is particularly hot in Italy, a peripheral country experi-encing high levels of public debt, high unemployment and low competitiveness.Many politicians have been surfing the Eurosceptic feeling for some timenow. The latest to join the club was the former prime minister Silvio Ber-lusconi. After having already supported anti-Euro positions in the past andmost recently in 2014, the “Cavaliere” recently claimed that he is now “fullyconvinced” that Italy should introduce a separate currency alongside the Euro.In his opinion, this would help Italy recovering its monetary sovereignty as theEuro would still be used for import and exports while the new currency wouldserve domestic transactions and state payments to “help the left behinds”(Newman, 2017). Needs to be said, this is probably just politics. Having ForzaItalia (FI)3 lagging in the polls, he is probably trying to regain some territoryplaying the moderate-Eurosceptic card. He knows that calling for Italy to fullyexit the euro would be too big a step for his party (and for his country).Though, there are two other significant Italian political parties that supportmore clearly anti-euro stances. Whether this being because of political or ide-ological purposes is only a matter of speculation. What does matter is that boththe Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Northern League have been steadilygaining ground in recent years. The M5S has called for a referendum on the exitof Italy from the Euro for some time now and is currently polling just shy of28% (Figure 1), disputing first place in the polls with the only big pro-Euro-pean party, the Centre-left Democratic Party (PD).The extreme-right-populist Northern League (LN) is arguably the most Eu-rosceptic party in Italy and has always supported an Italian exit from the Euro,even flirting with the idea of abandoning the European Union altogether. Latestpolls show that the LN falls just one point behind FI. Although an alliance be-tween NL, M5S and FI is unlikely, these three parties could well give the nextItalian Parliament a Eurosceptic majority. A wide alliance on the right, includ-ing FI and the NL along with smaller, profoundly Eurosceptic party Brothers ofItaly (FdI) would have the edge on the PD alone and might be the most viableEurosceptic government hypothesis.Aside from politics, signs coming from popular feels are not encouragingeither. Albeit most Italians are still in favor of the common currency (Figure 2),this support has declined by 11 points between September 2016 and February
3 A moderate-right political party founded by Silvio Berlusconi in 1994. Its english trans-lation would literally be “Come on, Italy”.
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2017 according to a poll conducted by Euro Metra Montrose (Figure 3)4. Still,although with some influent exceptions5, most Italians economists, govern-ment officials (current ones, though) and business executives have been reso-lute advocates of the Euro. “These days Italexit scenarios are very fashionablebut they give me the chills” Pier Carlo Padoan, Italy’s finance minister, said lastMarch, adding that those promoting such a concept “had no idea of the eco-nomic, social and cultural damage that would hit our citizens” (Politi, 2017).Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
4 http:/www.termometropolitico.it/1247131_sondaggi-elettorali-referendum-uscita-euro-intenzioni-di-voto.html5 See for example the work of Alberto Bagnai, an Economics Professor at Pescara Univer-sity.
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III. HOW COULD ITALY LEAVE THE EURO?Allow to briefly sum up the logic and the rationale behind a possible Eurozonebreak-up.In “Leaving the Euro: A practical guide”, Bootle (2012) gives us a good ex-planation of which is the real problem of the Eurozone. Basically, the introduc-tion of the Euro was carried out by fixing an exchange rate meant to compro-mise between the different strength of the currencies of the initial members.This has inevitably forced peripheral countries to sustain an “artificial” ex-change rate higher than their effective exchange rate while the opposite oc-curred for most of the core countries, notably to Germany. Therefore, countrieslike Italy or Spain are now dealing with a stronger currency than the one theircapacities would allow. This has translated in higher real costs and prices,thereby causing a loss of competitiveness that resulted in large current deficits.Poor competitiveness, together with excessive debt, made peripheral coun-tries face chronic shortage of aggregate demand that, in turn, has led to highlevels of unemployment.The EU has tried to solve this situation through austerity programs. This hasfailed.In his latest book, Stiglitz points out that “each country that undertook oneof the programs went into a deep downturn, sometime a recession, sometimea depression, from which recovery was at best slow” (2016a, 339). There isnow wide consensus6 that any other attempt to regain competitiveness and
6 See for example the European Solidarity Manifesto (2013), signed by more than 20 pro-fessors, chief economists, etc.
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work down public debt through austerity is bound to face the same faith. So, ifausterity proved ineffective (and backfiring), what can the solution be? Manyare now convinced that for countries affected by these problems, leaving theEuro could offer a way out.As already said before, the real problem for peripheral countries is that theyface sever and unsustainable imbalances in real effective exchange rates andvery high external debts. The introduction of the Euro has taken away the prin-cipal policy tool that countries traditionally used to adjust to external shocksand losses of competitiveness, i.e. the capacity of managing their own cur-rency’s exchange rate. Hence, Eurozone countries cannot “export their way backto prosperity” (Tepper, 2012, 38). Only by ditching the Euro they could restoretheir capacity to devaluate their currencies. By letting their currency fall theycould then regain competitiveness and start growing again through increasednet exports.Let us put aside all economic long-term theoretical speculations for a mo-ment now and focus on a bigger question: is ditching the Euro a feasible optionfor Italy?In order to answer to this question, we must look deep into the legal, eco-nomic and political consequences that the process of exiting from the commoncurrency would cause to the country. The first set of considerations that shouldbe cleared out are of legal nature. The biggest question here is, in fact, howcould Italy legally get out of the monetary union. In other words, is leaving theEMU even an option?If we look at what the official stance of the European Institutions has beenin the recent past, the answer is clearly negative. On January 2015, followingconcerns whether the upcoming Greeks elections at the time could have even-tually led the country out of the common currency, Brussels official refusedeven to speculate on the topic, and strongly reminded everyone that it existsno legal mechanism to be applied for a country wishing to leave the Eurozone.European Commission spokesperson Annika Breidthardt emphasized thispoint during a press briefing calling EMU membership “irrevocable”7. More re-cently, on January 2017, the Commission confirmed its stance in response to aquestion from Green MEP Rina Ronja Kari, who asked whether EU member-ship and the Euro were linked considering the defeat of Italian premier MatteoRenzi in last December’s referendum. Conversely, in its reply, the EU Commis-sion stressed again that “The substitution of the legacy currency by the euro isirrevocable” (Gutteridge, 2017).
7 RT news (2015).
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Few weeks later, the European Central Bank (ECB) Governor, Mario Draghi,also took on the issue. In a letter to two Italian lawmakers in the European Par-liament, Draghi basically threatened Italy saying that “If a country were to leavethe Eurosystem, its national central bank’s claims on or liabilities to the ECBwould need to be settled in full” (Reuters, 2017). Since according to EuropeanCommission’s TARGET2 Balance Report of the time, Italy was owning 358.6billion of Euro8, Draghi was subtly implying that an “Italexit” would be impos-sible. Many have though noticed that, although labelling it impossible for Italy,Draghi did admit the possibility of a break-up of the Euro-area and describedits conditions. Some countries (the majority) in the EMU owe way less thanItaly to the ECB in form of TARGET2 funds. What is arguably an unpayable billfor Italy may not be too much of an obstacle for other countries, including theones that have repeatedly flirted with the idea of ditching the common cur-rency9.Euro-exit supporters have also speculated on the fact that Draghi settled acondition but failed to specify some important details, like the currency thesettlement would have to be paid with, or what the ECB could and would do inresponse to a country which does not "settle its claims in full”. Even if we rec-ognize that at some level Draghi’s statement opens a possibility for the break-up of the Euro, the European Union’s position on the issue remains sky clear: theEuro is irrevocable. Yet, as many could say, this is just politics. It would not be inany interest of the European Union to clear and define possible ways for a coun-try to leave the common currency. Even if there were any, they would not tellyou.The study paper issued by the ECB itself and written by Phoebus Atha-nassiou (2009) is greatly helpful to understand the legal issues from a moretechnical and theoretical stand. He poses the question whether a legal right ofunilateral withdrawal from EMU exists. The word “unilateral” is intentional ashe explains that “a legal right of withdrawal can only concern a non-negotiatedwithdrawal (negotiated withdrawals are, in principle, always possible)” (Ivi, 8-9). While such right exists since the Lisbon Treaty regarding the withdrawalfrom the EU as a whole, the Treaties remain silent on the possibility of leavingthe Euro. According to Scott (1998) this has to do particularly with three rea-sons. First, including provisions for break-up could make commitment of theMember States to EMU look less strong; second, providing for the break-up
8 TARGET2 Balance Report of March 2017 shows that Italy’s debt have risen to 419.8 bil-lion of Euro. Target2 Balance Report Available at http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?no-de=10000048599 Greece “only” owns 75 billion, France not even one, Ireland is a creditor country for 3.6billion.
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could increase its likelihood; and third, envisaging such possibility would haveentailed the enormous and hard task of spelling out of the procedure and con-sequences of a withdrawal (Scott, 1998, 215). Whatever the explanation for thetreaties’ silence, its legal consequence is that, to date, there is no clear optionfor a country to leave the EMU.With no plain guidance from the European Treaties, can the Vienna Conven-tion on the Law of Treaties be of any help? Athanassiou clearly says no. Com-munity law differs markedly from public international law. With internationallaw, the effect of a norm in the national legal order is determined by nationallaw. In Community law, on the other hand, the effect of a norm is a matter ofthe Community law itself, not national. This means that “Community consti-tutes a separate legal system that may be contrasted with traditional publicinternational law in terms of institutional structures and outcomes” (Atha-nassiou, 2009, 18). It follows that whatever limited right of withdrawal the Vi-enna Convention establishes, this does not necessarily have legal force withinan issue of Community law. In sum, to legally exit from the EMU, a countryshould somehow fit this process into the European Treaties.There might be a loophole. If viewed as a remedy or a relief measure, theECB itself admits three hypothetical circumstances where a Member Statecould, in a real extreme situation, assert the right of unilateral withdrawal. Iwill leave aside the first two, since they are no relevant to our case. Let us focuson the third one, which allows unilateral withdraw “if a Member State facesextraordinary difficulties that prevent it complying with its treaty obligations”(Ivi, 19). Could a country like Italy advocate its legal right of withdrawal basedon this condition? Some may say yes, but this would be arguably highly contro-versial. Albeit they are not spelled out precisely, the extreme conditions thatAthanassiou talks about probably exceed the economic sphere. To better un-derstand what “extreme conditions” might mean in European law, one mustlook at the Treaties. For example, in providing the “extraordinary situation” acountry could assert to gain a temporary derogation, the Treaties talk about“serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law and order, theevent of war, serious international tension constituting a threat of war” or sit-uations where a country must carry out “obligations it has accepted for thepurpose of maintaining peace and international security” (cfr. Artt. 297-298EC).I seriously doubt that Italy’s current situation applies here. The conclusionis then that, if we rigorously stick to the Treaties, there is no legal right to uni-laterally withdraw from the EMU and exist no legal provision to do so. So whyare still so many people standing in favor of leaving the Euro?A main argument is that international law has historically been weakly
11
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binding and enforced. Community law is different from international law, true,but it is widely argued that exist no treaty or international provision that can-not be overcome if a strong political compromise comes into play. Athanassiouhimself comes to recognize that all legal conclusions drawn in his paper do nottake in consideration the political aspects and their possible consequences. Asan example, he remembers that “it is, no doubt, political consideration that ex-plains why, despite the founding treaties’ silence on the possibility of seces-sion10, no Member State contested the UK’s threatened withdrawal in 197511and why Greenland was allowed to leave European Communities in 1982”(Athanassiou, 2009, 21). After all, if it was to be agreed upon through wide po-litical compromise, it would not be a unilateral withdraw anymore.And, as already said, negotiated withdrawals are in principle always possi-ble (Ivi, 9). Some declarations of European leaders led Euro break-up support-ers to further speculate on the possibility of a political agreement. For instance,Hollande stated during an interview with France Inter radio that it was “up toGreeks” to decide whether to stay or quit the single currency union12 and, citingsources in the German government, German magazine Der Spiegel publishedan article saying that both Merkel and Schauble considered Greek’s exit “man-ageable”13. Moreover, Bootle suggests that it would, after all, be in the interestof the stronger countries to support the exit of their weaker partner, for theywould “ultimately benefit from the departing economy be stronger […] andthey might also benefit by being able to a tighter monetary union and a closerfiscal harmony with the remaining members” (2012, 8).This last argument in particular I find very hard to believe. Bootle implicitlyassumes that Italy would be stronger after leaving the Euro, which is highlydebatable. Also, in my opinion, historical evidences do not hold water. Green-land leaving the Communities cannot be compared to one founder MemberState wishing to leave the Euro. I then honestly doubt that a political agreementcould be found ex-ante. Furthermore, all the literature supporting Euro-exitagrees on the fact that, in order to avoid bank runs, capital flights and marketpanic, leaving the common currency must be planned in secret and announcedby surprise once everything has been already decided. Sure, a big part of nego-tiation would follow, but this does not mean it would be a negotiated exit.
10 We are here talking about pre-Lisbon European Law.11 The reference is to the UK’s then new Labour Government’s demand for a renegotiationof its accession terms, followed by a referendum on whether the UK should remain in the Com-munities. The very holding of this referendum postulated the existence of a right of with-drawal.12 RT news (2015).13 This was later denied by Vice Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel.
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Secrecy makes it as unilateral as it could be.It follows from all said before, that a country wishing to leave the Euro mustfind some kind of a loophole in the Treaties to justify it. Countries have histor-ically found a way out of treaties with the most creative excuses, even grantingthemselves a look of legality. Equally, Italy should also come up with some sortof expedient to advocate its right to withdraw from the monetary union andjustify what, in my opinion, would be a clear breach to the Treaties’ law.
IV. SHOULD ITALY LEAVE THE EURO?Scott argues that a country contemplating withdrawing from EMU is not likelyto be deterred by any treaty. This might be true. But it later adds that therewould be no “effective enforcement mechanism to compel adherence […] if acountry was determined to withdraw” (1998, 214). I disagree. Whatever theexpedient that Italy could allege, I highly doubt it would play on smoothly. Ifwe compare it to a sovereign state, the EU does not have the same effectivepower to compel a Member State to respect European law, i.e. to force Italy tostay inside the Euro14. True, but it does have a wide range of means that couldmake leaving the Euro so painful that Italy might actually reconsider ditchingit. In particular, political costs are likely to be particularly serious.Italy’s exit might damage, for example, the balance sheets of other MemberStates’ banks and surely would reduce markets’ trust in the Euro and in Europeas a whole, driving out investments from the continent. Diplomatic tension andpolitical resentment could follow, and cooperation in any sector, also nonmon-etary issues, would suffer. These costs are hard to calculate, but that does notmean they should be underrated. If Italians were to affect their credibility asreliable partners (by planning to exit the Euro in secret, for instance) they willsuffer real strong consequences, especially since Italy is inside the EuropeanUnion, a much more integrated environment than anything else in the world.Most notably, Eichengreen suggests that “the deflector would be relegated tosecond-tier status in intra-European discussions of nonmonentary issues”(2010, 13). If Italy sees its future as an active partner of the European experi-ence and attaches value to its participation to the process of European Integra-tion, this cannot happen.Moreover, exit by one member would raise doubts about the future of the
14 There is no European police or army to enforce European law.
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monetary union not only abroad but even inside Europe, especially if it is Italyto leave. Let us imagine for a moment if Germany was to leave the Euro. Thiswould mean a depreciation for the Euro and enhanced competitiveness formany Southern countries. Ironically, many think that if it was Germany to exitthe monetary union would be better off, and assert a “Germanexit” as a possi-ble solution for the Eurozone crisis (cfr. Eichengreen, 2010). But if it was Italyto leave, residual members would suffer a further loss of competitiveness. Thiscould cause a domino effect as other peripheral countries would see their sit-uation further worsened and might want to follow Italy’s example.Could the common currency withstand all of this? We cannot know for sure.There is a wide range of possibilities between the two extremes of a smoothItaly’s exit and a dismantling of the Euro. But the very fact that we cannot dis-card the latter should already constitute a phenomenal warning. Italy does notwant Euro’s death on its conscience, that is for sure.As I said before, the EU has effective means to respond to a hypothetical exitof a Member State from the EMU. If the Commission recognizes that such exitconstitutes a breach of the law of the Treaties, it could take, with the supportof the ECJ, a variety of actions against the guilty Member State. These are spelledout in Art. 260 of the TFEU and includes among others economy sanctions, finesand European Funds’ cuts.15 If Italy is not deterred by any of them and still de-cides to exit, we can imagine that the EU could take further action, this time withthe rationale of punishing Italy and deter any domino effects. Could the Unioneven expel Italy from the EU? As Athanassiou (2012) points out, unlike theCharter of the United Nations, European Treaties do not provide a collectiveright of expulsion of a EU Member from the Union and “the legitimacy of itsassertion or introduction would be highly questionable, both legally and con-ceptually” (Athanassiou, 2009, 35). Still, according to European Law the onlylegal way to ditch the common currency would be to leave the EU. On this basis,we can imagine that the Union could somehow “persuade” Italy to leave the Un-ion under Art. 50. Moreover, the Treaties do give the Council the authority tosuspend some of a Member State’s rights, including its voting rights in the Coun-cil, in the case of a persistent breach of European law. No right of voting in theCouncil, joint with political enmity, would almost mean a de facto political ex-pulsion for Italy.How likely is all of this to happen is only a matter of speculation. Still, it issomething that cannot be discarded altogether. Again, the sole existence ofsuch possibility should constitute a huge deterrent for Italy and should not be
15 For a more comprehensive understandment of which kinds of sanction the EuropeanUnion could take see Scheppele (2013).
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underrated. In our times, an Italy out of the European Union just does not makeany sense and I won’t even discuss the catastrophic consequences that thiswould mean for the country.Pro-exit literature seems to generally underrate these problems. There is,in fact, wide consensus that legal issues and political repercussions could beeventually overcome if Italy was to behave “well”. Somehow, many scholarsare truly convinced that such process would take place in a cooperative envi-ronment. The possibility of being forced to leave the EU is not even considered.Bootle states that “the legal status of a country leaving the Euro but wishing toremain within the EU could be clarified by a Treaty amendment which put thatcountry in a similar position to that of the UK and Denmark […]. This wouldprobably require the agreement of all Member States” (2012, 27). It just cannotbe this easy. Such amendment would need a massive political compromisewhich I doubt Italy could sponsor and eventually earn. Worries about estab-lishing a precedent and spelling out a procedure to ditch the common currencymight constitute an insurmountable obstacle.In sum, it is highly questionable if leaving the Euro is a feasible option forItaly and if there is a legal way to do so. What is most probable is that, even ifItaly could find a way out, this would come at huge political costs.Let us imagine that, despite everything, Italy does decide to leave. The pro-cess of leaving the common currency itself still poses many problems. First ofall, we need to consider the legal barriers to exit the EMU.To start with, redenomination of contracts would surely be a great issue to dealwith. Private contracts, savings or borrowings are more of an economic prob-lem and, as such, I will deal with them later. I will now focus on the redenomi-nation of the Italian government debt. The common stance here is that Italyshould announce its willingness to redenominate all its debt into lira16 on thesame day it announces its willingness to leave the EMU. The problem is thatnot all such contracts are with Italian creditors, nor are all issued under Italianlaw. A further complication arises since, as Eichengreen (2010) notes “con-tracts are not simply being redenominated from one Italian currency to an-other; rather, they are being redenominated from a European currency to anItalian currency. Foreign courts might therefore take EU law as the law of thecurrency issuer (Italy) and invalidate the redenomination of certain contracts”(Eichengreen, 2010, 27). Theoretically, when a case involves two currencies,the courts should apply the law specified in the contract. For most of Italianbonds, this is Italian law. But there is a big chunk of Italian bonds that fall within
16 For convenience, I assume that Italy’s new currency would be called like the one thecountry used to have before adopting the Euro.
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other jurisdictions. There should be no problems with the former, for Italiancourts would probably rule in favor of the redenomination of all bonds intoliras. Still, as I just pointed out, it might be argued that debts issued in Italywere issued under European, not Italian, law. As for the latter, I doubt that for-eign courts would rule in favor of something that would highly disfavor theirfellow citizens. This might mean that Italy would have to repay in Euro thosecontracts, which account for almost 30% of the total (Figure 4), a share we can-not overlook. Figure 4
Moreover, there is wide consensus (Eichengreen, 2010; Tepper, 2012; Boo-tle, 2012) that the redenomination of debt into local currency, although itwould not legally be a default, it would certainly be considered a technical de-fault by rating agencies and international bodies and organizations such as theISDA or the IMF. Another shared belief is that redenomination and technicaldefault would have to be followed by some sort of debt rescheduling, whichmust go through strict cooperation with the Paris and London Clubs and theIMF. Having such a big share of debt under non-Italian jurisdiction might raiseseveral legal disputes and render the whole process much more problematic.Also, in order to prevent capital flights and banking collapse caused bybank-runs, it is likely, and suggested by many, that Italy introduces capital con-trols the day it announces its willingness to leave the Euro. Some claim that afix limited amount for cash withdrawal should be put in place, too. Bootle even
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suggests that, at the moment that redenomination was announced but beforenew lira notes were available, cash machines would need to be shut down andthe government should declare a bank holiday in which all banking transac-tions were prevented. Also, borrowing and lending abroad should be limitedand foreign businesses should be prohibited from repatriating profits. Again,capital controls at the borders should be immediately established.This Italian version of the Corralito, although only being for a limited periodof time, evidently constitutes a breach of European law, which clearly estab-lishes the free movement of capitals. To justify its actions, Italy might try toassert its right to gain a temporary derogation being this a “extraordinary sit-uation”. Bootle remembers that the Treaties do allow a temporary impositionof capital controls for a period not exceeding six months, if approved by theCommission and the ECB and agreed by a qualified majority in the Council. Tohim, “it would be relatively easy to gain the agreement of a qualified majority”(2012, 28). The argument here is that the ECB and other Member States wouldprobably have substantial exposures to Italy, therefore it would be in every-body’s interest to avoid a complete collapse of the Italian banking system andprevent massive capital flights. Again, I argue that Bootle takes too much forgranted. EU’s willingness to cooperate with a country that has controversiallyleft the monetary union some days before is, at the very least, questionable.In light of everything said so far, I can conclude that the legal issues of leav-ing the EMU and the political repercussions the country could suffer are themain reasons that make exiting the Euro an unfeasible option for Italy. The lit-erature supporting such scenario generally underrates these dimensions, as itexcessively relies on the possibility of political compromise and wide cooper-ation of the other Member States. Instead, they focus on the economic and tech-nical difficulties which the process of exit itself involves. Bootle remarks that“while it is widely argued that legal obstacles to a country unilaterally reintro-ducing its national currency are surmountable, (…) the associated difficultiescould be quite serious” (Ivi, 12). Even though it is my opinion that those diffi-culties are of second importance, they deserve to be analyzed.As I said, the economic rationale behind ditching the common currency isthat, reintroducing the lira and let it devaluate, Italy could restore its competi-tiveness and start to grow again.Going back to a local currency would involve redenomination of debt con-tracts which could lead Italy to default on its sovereign debt. Though, accordingto most of the pro-exit literature, for Southern countries orderly defaults anddebt rescheduling coupled with devaluations are not only inevitable but alsodesirable. Although recognizing that this process would accelerate insolven-cies (and not create them, as insolvencies are believed to be inevitable in any
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case), pro-exiters still believe that “Exiting form the Euro […] would provide apowerful policy tool via flexible exchange rates” and that, this way, “The Euro-pean periphery could then grow again quickly with deleveraged balance sheetsand more competitive exchange rates” (Tepper, 2012).These long-period assumptions have been widely contested. First, we can-not forget that the Euro brought a wide range of benefits to its members, whichwould all be lost when leaving it. Especially for those whose commitment toprice stability was previously weak and whose interest rates were high andgreatly variable, the Euro has proved really helpful and restored their credibil-ity on international markets. As even Eichengreen comes to admit: “Enhancedexpectations of price stability have brought down domestic interest rates, bid-ding up bond, stock, and housing prices. Foreign capital has flooded in to takeadvantage of this convergence play. The cost of capital having declined, invest-ment rises in the short run, and as households feel positive wealth effects, con-sumption rises as well” (2010, 15). The ones supporting the exit from the Eurounderrate the possible economic and political consequences of a default and ofthe loss of credibility on international markets. Also, the assumption that,through devaluation, Italy could export his way back to prosperity is far frombeing widely accepted and does not take into account the existence of globalvalue chains.The general position is that leaving the Euro would be, also economically, adisaster (cfr. Nordvig, 2014; De Bortoli, 2017; Alesina e Giavazzi, 2017; Prome-teia, 2017).First of all, the international reputation of Italy would arguably suffer. Thiscould lead to credit rating downgrades and higher sovereign spreads. In turn,this would mean higher debt-servicing cost which could spark an even biggerdebt crisis. Secondly, alleging that Italy is manipulating its exchange rate togain an advantage in trade, some European countries might establish a com-pensatory duty on Italian exports that, joint with renewed transaction cost,would strongly reduce any competitiveness gain. They could even imposetaxes on investments towards Italy, on the basis that it is unfairly attractingthem. Moreover, the redenomination of all contracts could be incredibly pain-ful to privates, especially to the ones, banks or firms, who operate locally buthave borrowed abroad and would see their liabilities instantaneously in-creased.Speculation in the markets could cause the lira to fall way more than ex-pected. It has been proved that, after a certain point, any further fall of the cur-rency produces less marginal benefits up to the point where it even becomescounterproductive (Bootle, 2012; Tepper, 2012). In case of iper-devaluation,iper-inflation could follow, substantially reducing real-wages value. In fact,
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wages could not keep up the pace of increasing prices, or else there would notbe any gain in competitiveness and the whole thing would have no point. Fi-nally, as I already discussed, internal and external capital controls would haveto be established in order to avoid a financial collapse and recession. Also,many suggest that a banking holiday should be announced. These measureswould “freeze” the banking system and are also likely to lead Italy into newrecession for as long as they are kept.These are just some of the economic negative effects Italy could face if itdoes decide to leave the current union. In addition, we can think other technicaldifficulties that would arise in the following days after the announce.As already mentioned, it would be better for Italy to plan the exit in secretand announce it by surprise, when everything is decided. But maintaining se-crecy over such a huge issue would not be easy, as many people would have tobe involved. If there was a leak, the consequences could be catastrophic. Panicsin the market, capital flows, bank runs, credit-crunch and potential financialcollapse are likely to follow and all of this would take place in a climate of rushand urgency. At this point, the government could try to deny everything, but ifit does not work the only solution would be to anticipate the exit with uncom-pleted planning. Every day of panic before the announce could cause severaldamages to the banking system and the government might have to interveneand bail some institutions. In order to do so the government might need to bor-row internationally in an unfavorable environment at higher interests and thebanking crisis could lead to a debt crisis17.Furthermore, in a democracy the redenomination of contracts would needa bill and would have to go through the parliament. The political process islikely to be slow and difficult since, because of secrecy, many political forceswould also be caught by surprise. Also, notes would have to be printed andcoins to be minted and this would require some time. It follows that therewould be a period of high uncertainty where it would be unclear which is thelegal tender. Some suggest the possibility of using no cash until notes are ready.Some other argues that “Italian euros”18 should be printed and used as theywere liras and later recollected when the actual lira is ready to be distributed.In my opinion, none of these possibilities could ever play on smoothly.
17 The so called “doom-loop”.18 Euros “stamped” by Italians authority, so they cannot be confused with “normal” Euros.
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V. CONCLUSIONSIn this paper, I have tried to address, and later disprove, the main rationalewhich led many authors to believe that Italy should leave the Euro.The common currency took away the principal tool a country had to adjustto external shocks, i.e. the capacity to manipulate its own currency’s exchangerate. By going back to the lira, Italy would be able to devaluate it, restore itscompetitiveness and grow again. Redenomination of debt contract wouldlikely lead to a technical default and to a rescheduling of the debt which areboth seen as desirable for Italy.After reviewing the main legal, political, economic and procedural issuesthat the process of leaving the EMU would involve, I concluded that legal issuesand political repercussions should alone deter Italy. Ironically, these are thekinds of issues that who is in favor of ditching the common currency is mostlyneglecting or underrating.Since there is no clear provision in The Treaties to leave the Euro, Italywould have to come up with some kind of expedient to justify such exit. Pro-leave literature argues that a political compromise could be easy to find andwould make legal issues a surmountable problem. Instead I think that secrecywould make ex-ante political agreement impossible and that Italy would facesevere political enmity across Europe. Cooperation in intra-European issues,and not just in monetary ones, would arguably deteriorate and Italy might berelegated to second-tier status partner. It is my opinion that who supports aEuro break-up relies too much on the fact that it would be in everybody’s in-terest to not let Italy fall too hard and ease the process. I disagree. As I showed,it is highly probable that the first concern of the European Union would be todeter any possible domino effect and, therefore, to show how painful can be toditch the common currency.Although the EU does not have an army or police corps to force Italy to stayinside the EMU, it does dispone of a variety of means to deter Italy from doingit or, if it still decides to leave, to punish it. Besides economic sanctions, themost painful consequences that Europe could make Italy suffer are, again, ofpolitical nature. Suspended voting rights in the council, joint with widespreadpolitical enmity, might mean a de facto political expulsion for Italy. If Italy at-taches any value to its active role within the European integration process thiscannot happen. We can even imagine, even though a right of expulsion stilldoes not exist, that the EU could persuade or somehow even force Italy to leavethe European bloc altogether. The only fact that such possibility cannot be dis-carded constitutes a phenomenal deterrent for exit supporters. Furthermore,legal issues concerning the redenomination of debt and the establishment of
GIOVANNI SANTAMBROGIO, LEAVING THE EURO
© 2018 CENTRO DI STUDI EUROPEI – UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI SALERNO
capital controls could exacerbate political hostility towards Italy.From the economic point of view, the alleged long-term benefits of leavingthe currency union are widely contested while there is wide consensus thatthere would be offsetting economic consequences in the short-period, most no-tably for privates.Another mistake pro-exiters falls into is the excessive trust they give to his-toric precedents. Indonesia, Argentina or Russia did grow again after devalu-ating but they were not inside a currency union and they were not part of thebiggest integration process mankind has ever seen. Political costs were almostnone to them in comparison. When they do provide examples of currency un-ion’s break up, they still fail to provide comparable examples. Both Tepper(2012) and Bootle (2012) bring the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian em-pire as a historical evidence. The world and its economic features are just toodifferent now to compare them to 1917.In light of everything discussed, I can then conclude that leaving the Euro,especially because of political costs, is not a feasible option for Italy.
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